Introduction
In this paper we report on the results of an international effort to compare the actual outcomes of environmental policies using economic incentive (EI) instruments with those using command and control (CAC). For six environmental problems, we compared the policies used by the federal government in the United States with the policies of one or more country in Western Europe. To the extent possible the problems and the policies were chosen so that a CAC policy on one side of the Atlantic is paired with an EI policy on the other.
The six problems are: (i) SO 2 emissions from utility and industrial boilers, (ii) NOx emissions from utility and industrial boilers, (iii) point-source industrial water pollution, (iv) phaseout of leaded gasoline, (v) phaseout of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting substances (ODSs), and (vi) chlorinated solvents. We found researchers who had done work on these policies before and commissioned them to update old and in a few instances prepare new case studies. The Appendix provides a list of researchers, titles of papers, and the URL where they can be downloaded.
Only recently has it been possible to find enough EI policies to carry out a project such as this. Until about fifteen years ago the environmental policies actually chosen were heavily dominated by CAC approaches. In the United States, the 1970s saw a great volume of new federal regulation to promote environmental quality, none of which could be characterized as economic incentives. Since then, however, there has been a remarkable surge of interest in EI approaches in environmental policy. Since 1990, whenever new environmental policies are proposed, it is almost inevitable that economic incentive instruments will be proposed and will receive a respectful hearing. Researchers and policy analysts are also looking carefully to find ways of incorporating elements of economic incentives in existing policies.
The reasons for the newfound popularity of EI policies are unclear. Perhaps it is due to the growth in awareness of economic incentive approaches among policy-makers and DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. policy analysts the 20 or so years between 1970 and 1990 . In the 1970s these approaches were quite unfamiliar to those outside the economics profession. Another possibility is the emergence of tradable emission permits in the late 1970s. Before then, the main EI alternative to the regulatory policies being implemented was the effluent fee. As we discuss further below, effluent fees could only encourage pollution sources to reduce pollution; they could not offer assurances that the sources would actually do so. By the 1980s the policy community was generally aware of a "quantity-based" EI alternativetradable emission permits -that seemed to provide the same assurances of the achievement of environmental goals that were offered by CAC approaches.
A third possible cause is the widespread disappointment with outcomes of the CAC regulations adopted in the 1970s. The U.S. experience between 1970 and 1990 repeatedly raised questions about the presumed effectiveness of CAC approaches. Even though Congress had passed air and water pollution statutes requiring stringent regulations on pollutant sources and tight timetables for implementation, it proved to be very difficult for the EPA to put such a program into effect. The regulations that were promulgated were also administratively complex and cumbersome, and the attempt to impose one-size-fits-all remedies on firms in very different situations spawned a raft of legal challenges. In other words, much of the enthusiasm for EI could be attributed to disenchantment with CAC.
Whatever the cause of this turnabout, it is clear that systematic comparison of the actual performance of CAC and EI policy interventions did not play a major role. That is our goal here: the explicit comparison of EI and CAC policies and policy outcomes in realworld application. To provide structure for this comparison we have compiled a list of assertions or arguments, mostly made for or against these instruments during the 1970s when western countries were for the first time forming comprehensive policies for controlling environmental pollution. For comparative purposes we compare after-the-fact or ex post outcomes with before-the-fact or ex ante expectations along a number of dimensions. That is, where possible we compare the achievements of the particular policy with the goals and expectations of the policy-makers.
European v. American Environmental Regulation
Before turning to instrument choice, we make a few observations about differences between European and American regulation, at least as revealed in these cases.
One versus many
Our six case study pairs illustrate that American and European regulators have to deal with similar environmental problems, but they often deal with them in different ways. The most obvious difference is that the European Union consists of many countries, the United States only one. It is one, moreover, that has allocated principal responsibility for environmental rulemaking to the Federal government, even though most environmental problems are local. This centralization of environmental policymaking is primarily the DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
result of a series of landmark statutes that were passed between 1969 and 1980. 1 It is not clear that these centralizing moves were part of a grand plan; rather they appear to have been prompted by more ad hoc concerns. First, there were some environmental problems that crossed state lines. More importantly, there was an air of crisis at the time, a concern that environmental problems had to be dealt with right away or there wouldn't be any environment left. Most of the states had, in the minds of many, demonstrated that they could not act quickly enough or forcefully enough to deal with the multitude of environmental problems facing the country. The federal government was also powerful enough to stand up to the large corporations that were presumably the primary source of environmental degradation. Federal authority over environmental policy also avoided the much-feared "race to the bottom" -polluters' shopping around for lenient states willing to sacrifice environmental quality for new jobs and economic growth.
Unlike the United States, the environmental tide in Europe reached flood stage at different times in different countries, beginning in the late 1960s in the wealthiest nations of western Europe, especially the Nordic countries, and sweeping south and east to reach the countries of the old Soviet empire by 1990 or so. Each country adopted its own policies according to its own timetable. But more recently the gathering momentum of economic, social and political integration in the EU has also provided a centralizing impulse to all kinds of policies, not least environmental policy.
Our European cases reflect this mix of country-specific and EU-wide policy initiatives. For example, the TCE case study concentrates on Sweden's ban but also refers to Norway's tax and to Germany's stringent regulation (albeit short of a ban). The mix of country-specific and EU-wide policies is seen in the leaded gasoline case. Individual countries had their own policies on introducing vehicles with catalytic converters. But if any countries required catalytic converters, possible inter-country travel would require all countries to introduce unleaded fuel, a measure that was to be fully implemented in the EU by 1989. The EU also implemented regulations in 1981 specifying the maximum and minimum content of lead in leaded fuel, and in 1998 specified a complete switchover to unleaded fuel by 2005. However, the heterogeneity among European countries on this issue as on other issues is large. Individual countries completed the phaseout of lead as early as 1994 (Austria), but as of 2000 leaded fuel made up nearly 20% of the gasoline supply in neighboring Italy.
Moreover, selection bias is clearly an issue for the cases we discuss. This bias occurs in the regulations selected for study and in the particular nations chosen to represent Europe. In fact, in most instances the European cases were chosen because an innovative policy had been adopted in a particular jurisdiction. Thus, most of the European regulations selected represent the exceptional European action, whereas the U.S. regulations are, by their very nature, national in scope. In that respect the U.S. actions can be thought of as representing the average rather than the exceptional policy.
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Further, these regulatory comparisons completely ignore the issues of timing or of preexisting environmental conditions. Certainly, earlier reductions are more valuable than those undertaken at a later date. Thus, the observation that the U.S. and European nations both phased out (covered) CFCs ignores the fact that the U.S. began the CFC phaseout almost a decade earlier than the Europeans. Similarly, although a few northern European nations actually started phasing out lead from gasoline earlier than the U.S.most finished later -in some cases by a decade or more. Further, neither the preexisting pollution levels nor the difficulty of achieving particular reductions are fully considered in the case studies. Overall, as appealing as it might be to draw implications about the relative stringency of the environmental programs across the shores of the Atlantic, we do not believe that our selection of case studies provide sufficient information to make credible assertions on this issue. In short, European environmental regulation tends to be much more heterogeneous than corresponding regulation in the U.S.
Ex ante analysis
Our case studies also suggest that European and American regulations differed substantially in the amount and nature of ex ante analysis. This difference is largely attributable to the long-standing requirement imposed on U.S. government agencies to carry out a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) to project the economic consequences of regulatory proposals and make it possible to compare the direct effects of the regulation with the cost.
2 For each regulatory alternative to control pollution, analysts at the EPA had to estimate the environmental effects, the abatement costs, any other indirect costs, and often any economic dislocations (such as plant closures or unemployment) likely to result from the regulation.
There was no European counterpart to this requirement. Very likely, regulators, regulatees and other parties in Europe were just as concerned about the benefits and costs of regulations as they were in the United States. But without a formal requirement to produce a public report, there was no paper trail available to researchers. Although our case study authors were in most cases able to reconstruct or infer estimates of the environmental consequences of the regulations in question, in only two cases were they able to find an ex ante estimate of anticipated costs. In three other cases, ex ante estimates of environmental effects were easy to produce, because the policy in question was a ban on discharge of a particular substance, and the anticipated change equaled the current discharge.
Perhaps coincidentally, it is interesting that both cases in which emission reductions exceeded expectations involved market-based approaches, while both cases where actual performance fell short of expectations relied on traditional command and control measures. This result is discussed in more detail in Harrington et al. (2000) .
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Regulatory ambition
A third potential point of comparison between European and American case studies lies in the stringency and effectiveness of the corresponding regulations. In light of recent transatlantic environmental controversies such as the American refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change or the genetically modified food fight, it would be easy for the casual observer to conclude that Europeans are much more concerned about environmental quality than Americans are. On this question it is useful to separate ex ante stringency from ex post regulatory performance.
These cases do not support the notion that European environmental objectives have been generally more ambitious than American ones. These cases suggest American environmental regulation precedes that of most European countries by several years, and the American environmental statutes enacted in the early 1970s were nothing if not ambitious. U.S. air and water pollution policy, which is represented in our set by the industrial water pollution regulations and the NOx emission regulations prior to 1990, fits this pattern, for example. In both cases ambitious goals were to be achieved within 7years (for air) or 13 years (for water) of implementation. The objective of the 1972 water pollution statute -zero discharge of pollutants by 1985 -is so extraordinary that there is some question whether this goal was ever taken literally by the members of Congress voting on it, and if so whether they fully understood the ramifications of zero discharge. The objective of the 1970 Clean Air Act, which was to achieve by 1977 air quality so clean that it protected the health of the most sensitive members of the population, is also quite stringent, and there can be little doubt that this objective is meant to be taken seriously. Although the primary ambient standards still have not been achieved, they remain the main drivers of clean air policy in the United States. Moreover, those standards were just revised and made even more stringent to reflect recent health-effects research.
3
Regulatory performance
But while the U.S. has adopted ambitious environmental policies, a few countries of Europe have arguably had greater success in implementation of such policies. As noted by case study authors Wätzold and Hansjürgens, Germany adopted a very stringent acid rain regulation requiring in excess of 90 percent abatement of SO 2 in flue gas from utility boilers. And Sweden adopted a NOx regulation for large industrial and utility sources that imposed marginal costs of 3000 $/ton of emitted NOx, a level comparable to permit prices in American NOx permit markets (such as the RECLAIM program in Southern California. 4 One thing that distinguishes these abatement policies from the stringent American policies mentioned above is that they have actually been implemented. German utility boilers actually have met and on average substantially exceeded the 3 PM2.5 and 8 hr O3 stds DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. regulatory requirements for SO 2 . Large industry and utility boilers in Sweden have also met their goals. In both these cases, the authorities could point to severe environmental problems, both the result of acid deposition, that was causing dramatic and visible ecological damage to forests and natural lakes.
One reason frequently given for the apparent differences in outcome is American litigiousness. It is a rare environmental regulation that does not end up in court. Proposed rules are challenged in regulatory proceedings and, after promulgation, in federal district courts. These district court decisions are frequently appealed to the circuit courts, and even further appeals to the Supreme Court are not uncommon. Every one of the U.S. policies in our sample of cases provoked courtroom challenges, and some, such as the Effluent Guidelines, provoked hundreds of challenges. In the European TCE case author Sterner reports that the Swedish ban was challenged by the Swedish chemical industry, and then comments on how unusual this is for Europe.
American litigation has had several effects on regulatory productivity. First, it has delayed promulgation of rules. Nowhere more than in Clean Water Act, where numerous lawsuits have prevented implementation of BAT rules. It has tied up EPA resources in revising the remanded rules. Arguably, it has resulted in rules that are less stringent.
Before concluding that European countries have been more successful than the U.S. at adopting stringent policies and implementing them, we should acknowledge that there are a number of reasons why such simple comparisons are not particularly credible measures of the relative stringency of U.S. vs European environmental performance. First, the cases only focus on individual pollutants, not on overall pollution levels. Thus, the fact that Germany undertook larger reductions in SO 2 emissions than the U.S. is not sufficient to support sweeping conclusions about the comparative regulatory stringency on one continent or the other. Second, comparing the U.S. to Sweden, or to the Netherlands, or even to a relatively large nation like Germany is tantamount to treating a single state, e.g., California or Massachusetts, as typical of the entire U.S. Just as income levels, historic traditions, and environmental concerns vary considerably across the different states or regions in the U.S., there is also extensive variation in these elements across different nations of Europe.
Product bans.
Product bans, the polar case of regulatory stringency, are well represented in our sample of cases on both the European and the American side. Several regulations fell into this category: both leaded fuel cases, both CFCs, and TCE in Sweden. Some might add industrial water pollution in the US, since it established a goal of "zero discharge." However, this "ban" is much larger in scale and scope than the others mentioned above, and it is possible that some in Congress regarded the goal as aspirational or rhetorical.
Of these, the leaded fuel and CFC bans were ultimately successful. Swedish TCE failed to achieve 100% emission reductions, although it did achieve reductions of 65 percentroughly the same reductions achieved in the U.S. (which did not include a ban). US DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
industrial water also failed to achieve zero discharge of pollutants, as required by the statute, but it is a special case.
If the bans were successful, then the post-regulation pollution level is zero. It is often easier to determine whether a ban has been effectively implemented than to estimate the effects of a policy that does not attempt to eliminate the pollutant entirely. Ordinarily the technology implementing a ban is the substitution of a new process or product, which is easier to observe.
Use of economic incentives
Overall we found little difference between the countries of Europe and the United States in the predilection for using economic incentives. However, we did find a dramatic difference in the type of instruments used. Among our cases, nearly all EI policies in the EU are emission taxes, while nearly all EI policies in the U.S. are marketable permits. The only exceptions are found in the policies for ODS, where a supplementary emission tax was used in the US and a tradable permit system was used in the EU. Why is this?
One possibility is that American environmental policies are more likely to have ambient objectives supported by specific targets and timetables for emission reductions. As noted in the discussion of hypotheses below, one characteristic of emission fees is that setting the level of the fee determines the final marginal cost of abatement, not the pollution abatement target. Europeans, perhaps, are more apt to be motivated by the "polluter pay" principle than the need to set some pre-specified ambient (or emissions) target.
This difference also could be related to different attitudes to taxes. European taxes are generally higher than in the U.S. and are structured differently, with more reliance on commodity taxes and less on income taxes. Europeans are accustomed to extremely high tax rates on some products, such as motorfuel, where taxes can make up over 80 percent of the total price of the product. Europeans are also more comfortable with the notion of using taxes to achieve other policy goals besides revenue raising.
The preference for tradable permit systems in the US dates back to 1976, when it became clear that a number of cities would not meet the 1977 deadline for attainment of the NAAQS. Under the Clean Air Act, this meant no new air pollution sources or expansion of existing sources. However, the Agency allowed new or expanding sources to proceed with their plans as long as they could find offsetting emission reductions among existing sources. Thus were the bubble and offset policies born.
An additional element pushing the EPA toward marketable permits was the fact that the Agency had no authority to levy new taxes. That power belonged to, and was jealously guarded by Congressional tax-writing Committees, and the members of those committees were generally disinterested in using the tax system for anything except revenue collection.
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Equity
In recent years questions about the fairness or equity of environmental regulation have arisen on both sides of the Atlantic. The most common question arising in public discussions is whether different income and/or racial groups have been disproportionately affected by either the uncontrolled risks or by the costs associated with the regulations. Accordingly, we asked the case study authors to pay particular attention to this issue. The results are somewhat surprising.
When the question is posed as a potential impact on the general population, only the U.S. case of lead in gasoline seemed to involve significant public debate on equity issues. Interestingly, what was identified in a number of cases as a significant equity issue is the potential burdens of the regulation on one or more segments of industry -mostly on small business. Six of the cases identified small-business impacts as significant (US/TCE, France/NO x , US/water, US/lead, Sweden,lead). In each of these instances the governments explicitly addressed the equity issue in the design of the regulation. The most common regulatory response was to exempt at least some categories of small business from the regulation. In the case of US/TCE, for example, most small gasoline station/repair facilities were exempted.
An additional response to equity concerns can be seen in the differential timeframes that particular nations adopted new regulatory requirements. This is particularly true in Europe where EU directives generally permit a good deal of flexibility at the country level. The authors of the European case on lead phase down highlight this issue. Specifically, they argue that despite the relatively high exposure to airborne lead among low income groups -and thus the obvious gains to this group from rapid adoption of the lead phase down program -a number of European nations, particularly low income nations, have been slow to adopt the program. While part of this response may be explained by the differences in perceived benefits, the case study authors suggest that this differential timing in adopting the regulation is based, in part, on cross-national equity concerns.
6
The Hypotheses
The last couple of decades have seen a good deal of speculation and disputation over the differences between EI and CAC instruments in practice, leading to the development of a fairly long list of assertions or hypotheses about these differences. Unfortunately, if you ask ten knowledgeable people, the ten lists you get will differ -probably dramatically so. That's because some of the characteristics of these policies can vary depending on policy details, or may be true only under some circumstances. Different observers may have DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. different policies or circumstances in mind. On other characteristics, the advocates and skeptics tend to agree. Where they may disagree is on the importance of the criterion. We do our best to be clear about what our assumptions are.
Policy details can also be altered to accommodate criticisms implicit in these hypotheses. For example, CAC policies can be made more or less cost-effective depending on how much effort is put into setting abatement requirements at the right levels. Emission fees are particularly easy to modify in this fashion, because they generate a source of revenue that can often be spent so as to remedy identified defects. We identify a few such opportunities below, keeping in mind that any revenues collected can only be spent once.
In this section we simply list the hypotheses. In the next section, we provide a rationale and review what the case study outcomes reveal about them.
1. Static efficiency. EI instruments are more efficient than CAC instruments 2. Information requirements. Generally, EI instruments require less information than CAC instruments to achieve emission reductions cost-effectively.
3. Dynamic efficiency. The real advantages of EI instruments over CAC are only realized over time, because unlike CAC policies they provide a continual incentive to reduce emissions, thus promoting new technology, and they permit a maximum of flexibility in the means of achieving emission reductions.
4.
Effectiveness. CAC policies achieve their objectives quicker and with greater certainty than EI policies.
5. Regulatee burden. Regulated firms are more likely to oppose EI regulations than CAC because they fear that they will face higher costs, despite the greater efficiency of EI instruments.
6. Administrative burden. CAC policies have higher administrative costs.
7. Hot spots and spikes. The performance of all pollution-abatement instruments is seriously compromised for pollutants with highly differentiated spatial or temporal effects, but more so for EI than for CAC instruments.
8. Monitoring requirements. The monitoring requirements of EI policies are more demanding than those of CAC policies because they require credible and quantitative emission estimates, whereas CAC policies only require evidence of excess emissions or the absence of abatement technology.
9. Tax interaction effects. Adverse tax interaction effects are likely to be larger with EI instruments than CAC instruments achieving the same emission reductions.
Effects on altruism.
Economic incentives encourage the notion that the environment is "just another commodity" and reduce the willingness of firms and citizens to provide environmental public goods voluntarily.
DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
11 Adaptability. Compared to CAC instruments, EI instruments can be changed more quickly and easily in response to changing environmental or economic conditions. 12. Cost revelation. With EI instruments, it is easier to observe the cost of environmental regulation. Theory tells us that for a firm subject to an emission fee, the marginal cost is the same as the fee rate; in a tradable permit regime, the marginal cost is the market price of the permits. With CAC instruments, a firm must clean up to a prespecified quantity; there are no fees or permit prices to which marginal costs can be equated.
Performance of EI and CAC Instruments
The selection of individual case studies was governed in large part by a desire to compare performance of different environmental instruments in at least a partially controlled environment. The "control" is the common environmental problem addressed in two or more different jurisdictions. Fixing the environmental problem to be addressed makes meaningful some comparisons that would not be clear if we simply compared different instruments in arbitrary applications, including stringency, abatement cost, technologies employed, introduction of new technology, and speed of implementation. It is these comparisons that yield the most insights about the hypotheses.
However, there are also some important limits of our approach. First, we suffer from the common problem of all case study research -a small number of observations, nonrandomly selected. Second, these cases differ in many aspects besides the policy instrument chosen -for example, political institutions, history, and pre-existing environmental quality. These differences can affect the outcomes we observe as much as the difference in instrument can. The complexity of the regulatory history or the varying structure of regulation in most cases made it difficult to make straight-up comparisons of a U.S. case with respect to its European counterpart with respect to certain hypotheses. Accordingly, make tentative judgments about some of the hypotheses by examining only one case out of a pair. Sometimes such comparisons are facilitated by the application of both types of instruments at different times, such as U.S. leaded fuel.
Third, as Table 1 makes clear, our instrument comparisons are rarely as clean as we would like. For each hypothesis, what we would like is to measure the quantitative difference in a response between the EI instrument and the CAC instrument. For example, the first hypothesis on efficiency would be supported if we conclude that the unit cost of abatement is less for the EI instrument than for the corresponding CAC instrument. But sometimes those differences cannot be observed quantitatively, because one case study is unable to report anything of relevance on the variable in question, or because differences in another variable hinder the ability to make comparisons. To continue with the efficiency example, a difference in unit costs between the two policies could be due to a difference in overall stringency, which would have no particular implications for the efficiency hypothesis.
On the other and, the richness of the case studies means that we can often arrive at a tentative judgment about a hypothesis even if we only have results from only one of a DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. pair of studies. For example, the finding of high administrative costs in the U.S. water pollution case (CAC) is based on the extremely large number of regulations that had to be written and on the extensive delays. This observation required no close comparison with the Dutch opposite number, which incurred no similar delays. However, when we observe that the administrative costs of the German SO 2 policy (also CAC) were relatively low compared to the U.S. acid rain policy, then it raises the question of whether it is the instrument chosen that is driving administrative costs, or American litigiousness.
To the hypotheses, then.
Static efficiency. EI instruments are more efficient than CAC instruments.
Rationale. It is commonly believed that EI instruments, in theory, have an efficiency advantage over CAC instruments, but in fact the theoretical case for EI instruments is not airtight. As described above, EI instruments are more cost-effective than CAC instruments at achieving a given emission reduction. To get from cost effectiveness to efficiency additionally requires the standard assumptions of the model of perfect competition, in particular price-taking firms and complete information. It also requires the emissions to be "uniformly mixed," that is, their effects are not location-specific, and abatement cost functions are convex. Finally, in an emission fee system the fee has to be set to equal the marginal social damage caused to the emissions.
In a world of perfect information a CAC instrument can be designed to be efficient as well. The regulator just has to choose the emission standard for each source so that the marginal costs of abatement equal the marginal social costs of pollutant damage. Emission fees do have a long-run theoretical advantage, however. Spulber (1985) shows that, in principle, the firm producing a good X should pay a fee on the use of environmental services associated with production of X, just as it has to pay for all other inputs. Without it, in the long run too much X will be produced. In a transferable permit system this advantage can be met by auctioning the permits rather than distributing them gratis among the firms producing X.
Performance. While not all of the cases made explicit comparisons between the two instruments, those that did were uniform in their findings of efficiency advantages for economic incentive measures. Some of the larger gains from such measures are found in the U.S. SO 2 and lead phase-down programs. As SO 2 case study authors Burtraw and Palmer argue, after accounting for exogenous changes in fuel markets in a consistent manner, realized costs are only about one-half the predicted levels based on information available to legislators in 1990; and perhaps a quarter of the cost of a linear rollback command-and-control technology standard.
Lead case study authors Newell and Rogers report that the banking program itself, by allowing for a more cost-effective allocation of new investment within the industry, saved over $225 million when compared to an inflexible command-and-control approach. The whole program, including trading, is estimated to have saved considerably more.
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In the Dutch water case, case study authors Bressers and Lulofs note that the degree of pollution reductions in the early years corresponded well to the production cost incentives created by the fees, which indicates that discharges were reduced fairly efficiently. In contrast, in the U.S., the ex ante estimates of marginal abatement costs varied by a factor of 30 across a sample of industry categories. Thus, even though no additional information was available ex post, case study author Harrington suggests it was not very likely that cost-effective reductions were achieved.
German SO 2 case study authors Watzold and Hansjergens note that there can be limits to the static efficiency advantages of economic incentives. In cases where the regulations are extremely stringent and everyone has to do all that is technically feasible in order to meet the emissions goal --as in the case of the German SO 2 regulations-the gains from trade are very limited. In that case economic incentives are not likely to yield significant savings without jeopardizing achievement of the stringent quantity objectives.
In contrast, there is solid evidence that economic incentives achieved substantial cost savings when used to orchestrate the elimination of CFCs and lead in gasoline. Presumably EI worked in these cases of maximal stringency because there were cost heterogeneities that could be exploited during the phasedown period. In the German SO2 case, the similarity of the power plants and the abatement technologies available suggest relative uniformity of costs, thereby reducing the potential advantage for economic incentives.
Overall, it appears that these cases at least do lend support to the textbook proposition that economic incentives are more cost-effective than command-and-control approaches to pollution control.
Information requirements.
Generally, EI instruments require less information than CAC instruments to achieve emission reductions cost-effectively.
Rationale. The claim of smaller information requirements for EI clearly refers to the burdens placed on the regulator as opposed to the regulated entity. To set cost-effective standards using a CAC instrument a regulator needs to know the marginal costs of all the regulated sources. In contrast, for EI instruments, the regulator does not require the same detailed cost data. Rather, much of it can remain with the regulated entities who, in turn, will have obvious incentives to develop accurate, facility-specific data that they might not otherwise be motivated to collect or share with regulators. (See the discussion on the cost revelation hypothesis below.)
However, there are several other kinds of information needed to make successful environmental policy, including the enforceability and environmental effects of proposed regulations. In these areas, EI instruments have no obvious information-economizing advantages over CAC instruments. Because we treat these types of information specifically below (when we consider the hot spot and monitoring hypotheses), we focus here only on the cost information.
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Performance. With this proviso the hypothesis appears to be reasonably well supported by the case studies. To implement the EI instruments in Europe, the authorities did not have to acquire a great deal of information about plant-level costs. For EI instruments used in the United States, on the other hand, it is not apparent that the choice of instrument affected information requirements. First, because of the emphasis on ex ante studies in the United States, some information about costs for leaded gasoline and flue gas desulfurization had to be collected prior to implementation of these EI instruments (or had already been collected to implement earlier CAC rules). Second, the novelty of economic incentives, together with the need to meet emission reduction targets specified in legislation, required careful analysis of regulatory proposals prior to issuance in order to raise the confidence of all parties that the new regime was going to work as anticipated.
When we turn to CAC rules we find substantial information requirements even when no attempt is made to write cost-effective regulations. For technology-based standards, it was originally thought that the main task of information collection was to identify a standard and a technology that would meet that standard, and that that task could be accomplished by considering broad classes of industries, with no need for more detailed data collection. For EPA's Effluent Guidelines, for example, case study author Harrington reports that considerations of cost impact, not cost-effectiveness, created substantial demands for information. For one, the sheer heterogeneity of industry and industrial processes was staggering. The information requirements of technology-based standards turned out to be formidable, because of the multiplicity of industries (and technological processes) and often the need to set several standards for each process. While the same abatement technologies could be designated for several different industries, the Agency nonetheless had to provide evidence that the designated technology was a feasible choice for that industry. Furthermore, equity considerationsboth substantive and procedural--placed additional information collection burdens on the EPA. Typically, the Agency has been besieged with claims that great harm to petitioning firms would follow from the regulations, often supported by extensive documentation that, in turn, placed additional burdens on the Agency to respond.. Under the terms of the Administrative Procedures Act, the EPA had to take these claims seriously, often requiring further analysis and sometimes collection of new data.
Rationale. The effects of CAC regulation on technology are potentially complex. On the one hand, costly regulations provide a continual spur to find less costly ways of compliance. Furthermore, new source performance standards, which are a common feature of CAC regulations, were intended to encourage dissemination of advanced abatement technology as old plants retired and were replaced by new plants with current technology. On the other hand, the very requirement to install new technology conceivably discourages research in new abatement methods by pollutant dischargers, since discovering ways to reduce emissions can become the basis of even more stringent DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
standards. This phenomenon has been called the 'regulatory ratchet." (It would not discourage innovation by the pollution abatement industry, of course.) New source performance standards have the stated objective of promoting new technology, which they may do, but they could also have the pernicious effects of postponing retirements of older, dirtier plants and increasing barriers to entry by outside firms.
Performance. The evidence from the case studies on dynamic efficiency provides general, although not universal, support for the traditional textbook view that EI provide a greater incentives than CAC for continuing innovation over time. Certainly, the U.S. lead and SO 2 cases, as well as the Swedish NO x case, provide strong support for this hypothesis.
In the case of the U.S. lead phase down program, the authors note that the pattern of technology adoption was consistent with an economic response to market incentives and plant characteristics. Specifically, they found a significant divergence in the pattern of technology adoption among refineries with low versus high compliance costs: low cost refineries (i.e., expected permit sellers) significantly increased their likelihood of adoption relative to the high cost facilities (expected permit buyers) under market-based lead regulation compared to under individually binding performance standards. Interestingly, in the case of the U.S. SO 2 program, the authors note that innovation has occurred principally through changes in organizational technology, the organization of markets, and through experimentation at individual boilers rather than through more traditional measures, e.g., patentable discoveries. They argue that under a prescriptive regulatory approach the incentives would not have existed for some of these discoveries, such as fuel blending or performance improvements at scrubbers.
As Swedish/French NO x case study authors Sterner and Millock report, the Swedish NO x charge created strong incentives for fuel switching, modifications to combustion engineering and the installation of specific abatement equipment such as catalytic converters and selective non-catalytic reduction. Equally important, the use of a fee created incentives to use the equipment, to fine tune combustion and other processes in such a way as to minimize emissions. The Swedish experience suggests a strong connection between the monitoring requirements and the observed emission reductions via fine-tuning. The monitoring, in turn, only became a reality due to the high charges which had to be based on accurate emission figures.
In the Dutch water case, while much of the initial responses represented little more than good housekeeping measures, subsequently more advanced, so-called 'process-integrated measures' were also taken. Furthermore, the Netherlands became a world leader in the development of new water purification technologies, e.g., nitrate bacteria, membranes. Also, it is noteworthy that a number of engineering consulting firms sprung up in the country subsequent to the development of the new policies. Overall, it is estimated that on average the unit abatement costs for organic pollutants dropped by half between 1986 and 1995.
Command-and control approaches can also create incentives for innovation. For example, authors Wätzold and Hansjürgens find that the German SO2 ordinance (GF-DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. AVO) was truly technology-forcing. The required stringency put the regulation at or beyond the technological frontier for flue gas desulfurization, and utility officials were very concerned whether advances in technology would enable the regulation to be met. However, the pollution abatement industry was able to rise to this challenge. Indeed, Wätzold and Hansjürgens observe that the "regulatory ratchet" -the incentive for firms to avoid innovation if it simply means that they are subject to more stringent regulationdoes not apply to vendors of pollution abatement equipment, who have strong incentives to demonstrate advanced technology, regardless of policy instrument.
Similarly, U.S. NO x case study authors Burtraw and Evans report that some experimentation with innovative post-combustion controls occurred for compliance with Phase I OTR RACT standards even though the abatement policy in the region was relatively inflexible. They also note that those plants that engaged in experimentation in the OTR region were often treated differently by regulators and some received subsidies from DOE. Thus, innovation incentives in CAC regimes often come about through administrative procedures or exceptions that are supplemental to the regulation.
A similar finding of possible innovation under command-and-control is also found in the U.S. water case. As case study author Harrington notes, if the adoption of process changes instead of end-of-pipe treatment is taken as the measure of innovation, then one can clearly observe a significant increase in the use of innovative technologies during the period of the command-and control regulations. Although it is impossible to say what use of process change would have been employed in an economics incentives regime, the results do suggest that command-and-control is not without effect in encouraging out-ofthe-box thinking in abatement. On the other hand, Harrington also reports anectodal evidence that a set of technical documents prepared by the EPA in 1975-1980 describing wastewater treatment technologies is still considered a pretty accurate description of the current technology, at least for some industries.
Overall, the evidence suggests strong evidence of innovation under economic incentives regimes. Under command-and-control innovation also occurs, but the pattern is different and the rate is probably lower.
4. Effectiveness. CAC policies achieve their objectives quicker and with greater certainty than EI policies.
Rationale. In the early 1970s CAC looked like a straightforward application of the government's police power. Disinterested experts would develop emission standards for each point source industry based on the technology criteria established by Congress. This approach might not find the least costly abatement opportunities, but at least it would establish clear rules and identify specific ways of complying with those rules, thus expediting compliance.
Concerns about effectiveness were probably the main reason for the reluctance to adopt EI instruments early on. Emission fees bore especially heavy criticism in this respect, deriving from the uncertainty about the emission reductions that would result from a particular fee. For the earliest emission offset policies there was also a concern, because DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
of the possibility of "paper trades" or fanciful estimates of emission credits. As noted above, concern about the authenticity of emission reductions led to tighter restrictions on trade rather than to allowing bogus trades that increased emissions.
With marketable permits, there is a cap on aggregate emissions, so presumably effectiveness is high. However, it is still likely that if we compare a nontradable permit (i.e. CAC) policy to a tradable policy with the same aggregate emission rate, we will find lower overall emissions with the CAC policy. Under a CAC policy plants routinely overcomply with emission permits. If these permits can be traded, then this emission gap suddenly has value and will very likely be traded to a source that will use them (Oates, Portney and McGartland (1989) describe a similar mechanism for ambient standardsetting).
Performance. The evidence on the comparative effectiveness of the different instruments is quite mixed. In both TCE cases -which focus on command-and-control approaches --there is evidence that substantial emission reductions were achieved in a short period of time. The dramatic character of the prohibition in Sweden appears to have speeded up research into alternatives and likely benefited users even outside Sweden. However, the Swedish ban was ultimately unsuccessful, achieving an emission reduction of only about two thirds. In a direct comparison to the high tax rate on chlorinated solvents in neighboring Norway, case study author Sterner found the economic incentive policy to be more cost-effective and at least as effective. Sterner also suggests that a lower but broader tax on many chlorinated solvents, as was used successfully in Denmark, would very likely have reduced toxic exposure by at least the same amount as the existing Swedish ban at much lower cost. In the U.S., case study authors Loh and Morgenstern report that the observed emission reductions -roughly the same percentage as achieved in Sweden -were based almost entirely on CAC mechanisms. Apparently, the early reduction program developed by the EPA was not sufficiently attractive to industry to encourage widespread participation.
In the case of lead phase down in Europe the case study authors argue that the use of a tax differential without also mandating the use of catalytic converters and the maximum lead content of fuels would have slowed the phase down significantly. Similarly, the authors of the German SO 2 case highlight the rapid reductions achieved under the command-and-control system. Specifically, they note that large emission reductions were required within 5 years for plants installing scrubbers and within 2 years for plants which switched fuels -clearly a faster pace than in the market-based U.S. system. They also note that at least in the early years of the program there was a good deal of over compliance, as firms tended to operate with significant safety margins in order to avoid both the mandated compliance penalties and the adverse publicity associated with violations.
7 8 While there has been considerable over compliance in the U.S. system as 7 For the same reason they argue that it is also not so important that suppliers of abatement equipment provide such strict guarantees of abatement performance.
well, the fact that the excess reductions could be used at a later date implies quite different environmental implications than in the German case.
Contrary to the stated hypothesis, considerable support can also be gleaned for the view that incentive-based policies achieve emission reductions more rapidly and with greater certainty than command-and-control approaches. The U.S. SO 2 case, the Dutch water case, and the U.S. lead case studies all make that point.
In the U.S. SO 2 case, the authors argue that the almost perfect compliance record established under Title IV makes a strong case for environmental effectiveness. Of course, the German case study authors would counter with the argument, as noted, that the command-and-control approach created incentives for over compliance, in order to establish a safety margin. Since CCEMS were required in both systems, there was (presumably) a high degree of reporting accuracy in Germany as well as in the U.S. In the Dutch water case, the authors argue that the influence of effluent fees on organic waste load reductions was prompt and extremely large. In the U.S. lead phasedown the authors argue that the incentive-based phase down program, combined with the requirements that cars install catalytic converters, achieved in 1981 what the feet turnover alone would not have achieved for an additional six years.
Interestingly, at least two of the cases point to significant environmental gains from both approaches, albeit with some undesirable side effects over the longer term. For example, the prescriptive approaches adopted to reduce U.S. NO x emissions led to emission reductions of about 17 percent from coal-fired power plants, if measured under somewhat fictional assumptions that their influence did not effect other operational and investment decisions. However, it is widely believed that NSPS provided an incentive to extend the life of existing plants to avoid costs associated with pollution control at new plants. This perverse incentive is likely to have undermined the accomplishments of NSPS to some degree. At the same time, the authors argue that in the Title IV NO x program, the absence of an aggregate cap may be responsible for the observed (net) increases in emissions from coal-fired boilers during the 1990s. In the U.S. water case, the authors point out the difficulty of making highly prescriptive environmental regulations as stringent in practice as they appeared at the time they were debated in the Congress. Thus, they note that for many industries covered by the Effluent Guidelines program, the BAT (command-and-control) regulations were mired in so many details that they were delayed for more than a decade past their statutory deadlines.
Finally, in the Swedish TCE case study Sterner suggests that unsuccessful CAC policies may have broader implications for the credibility of environmental institutions. In response to the regulation, Swedish users of TCE were able to act in a concerted manner to persuade the public and the environmental authorities that complete implementation of the ban would cause undue harm. The authorities allowed numerous waivers and exceptions to the ban. These successes may have undermined the authority of the Swedish EPA, emboldened firms to oppose other regulations, and demoralized those firms that did comply with the regulation, perhaps giving them reason to think twice DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
about cooperation with the environmental authority in the future. It is doubtful whether a similar problem would arise with EI instruments. After all, the firm's cost is capped by an emission fee or the price of an emission permit. The fee or permit price, moreover, is known to the regulator, which pretty much eliminates the possibility of bluffing by the firm. Even if it decides not to abate, it can do so by paying the fee rather than challenging the authorities.
Rationale. The assertion of greater cost effectiveness of EI instruments refers to social costs, the sum of costs to all members of society. When it comes to the private costs imposed on regulated firms, the burden of EI will often be greater than that of CAC.
Under CAC, a polluting firm pays the cost of pollution abatement. Under an emission fee policy, the firm pays the cost of abatement plus a fee for remaining pollution discharged. The firm is better off only if the abatement cost is lower by an amount at least as great as the fee payments. Buchanan and Tullock (1975) point out that this could account for much of the opposition of the business community to effluent fees during the 1970s.
Under some circumstances it will be possible to use the fee revenues to overcome such opposition, by revenue recycling -redistributing fee revenues to pollution sources. To preserve the incentive effects, the redistribution has to be made not proportional to emissions, but on some other basis. With tradable permits, such concerns can be overcome by distributing permits gratis to emitters rather than auctioning them off. However, such reimbursements subsidize the use of environmental resources in production and in the long run encourage overproduction of output.
Performance. Experience on both sides of the Atlantic suggests that no government ever put this hypothesis to the test, which, in a way, is strong support for it. Although recent legislative proposals in the U.S. have called for partial auctioning of allowances, historically permits have been allocated gratis. However, with cost of service regulation the regulatory burden is generally less under gratis allocation.
In Europe, regulatory burdens were reduced in the French and Swedish NOx cases by returning the collected emission fees to the industries from which it had been collected. In Sweden the fees were returned directly on the basis of energy produced. In France the revenues were used to subsidize abatement investments by the firms contributing the fees. In France the burden was low in any case because the tax rate itself was so low. Its primary purpose was to give firms an additional incentive to comply with CAC emission limits Authors Hammar and Löfgren of the European lead phase down case argue that the use of a tax differential -with a lower tax rate on unleaded -tended to reduce the overall burden of gasoline taxation on the refinery sector. Although via a different logic, the DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
authors of the U.S. lead phase down case also conclude that the regulatory burden of the regulation was reduced by the use of a rate based program cum banking. On both sides of the Atlantic the refiners were able to pass most of the additional costs forward to consumers.
In the first phase of Title IV of the U.S. SO 2 program, the case study authors argue that the regulatory burden associated with permit costs was not an important factor for either producers or consumers. This is because most of the U.S. electricity sector was regulated according to cost of service, and prices reflected allowance costs at the original cost to the firm. Since allowances were distributed for free, they typically were not reflected in electricity prices. This approach is politically appealing but, as the authors note, may create costs in the form of a misallocation of resources in the general economy.
In the Dutch case, the fee collections were used to support the construction of treatment facilities; the incentive effects were unanticipated. They were hardly a burden since the contribution to collective treatment replaced much of the firms' private abatement costs. Rather, the fee system served as a device to distribute treatment costs fairly on the basis of the polluter-pays principle. Against this yardstick, no extra direct costs are imposed on industry as a result of the tax.
In all cases where economic incentive measures were used, explicit efforts were made to recycle tax revenues or otherwise limit the burden on existing sources, e.g., by grandfathering allowances. Especially in the cases where the firms were able to pass the costs forward to consumers, it is likely that the regulatory burden was significantly reduced -possibly even completely offset. In contrast, under a command and control system, where no revenues are generated, there is no obvious means of offsetting regulatory costs.
Administrative burden. CAC policies have higher administrative costs.
Rationale. Administrative burden is closely related to information costs and hence to policy objectives. Beyond information, administrative costs are determined by the amount of interaction between the regulator and the regulated sources. There are several reasons to think these costs might be greater under a CAC than, for example, under an emission fee. During the pre-implementation phase, establishing a CAC policy requires the setting of specific requirements for each regulated source, whereas only one (or at most a small number of) fee rates need to be set, applicable to all sources. The multiplicity of individual standards, and the possibility of changing them, might encourage more lobbying and negotiation by affected sources as well. After implementation, CAC policies have higher administrative costs because violations quickly pass from the administrative system to the legal system. Fee collections, on the other hand, are another case of tax collections, for which the authorities usually have an administrative system established and which leads to legal difficulties only in exceptional cases.
One final administrative advantage of EI instruments concerns the incentives they offer to regulated sources to contest the policy. By their very nature, fee collections for increased DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. emissions tend to rise gradually, whereas with CAC there is a bright line that separates compliance from violation, which in principle means that there is a step discontinuity in the penalty function. The potentially high incremental cost at the point of violation gives sources an incentive to defend themselves legally rather than accept sanctions.
Of all the hypotheses we examine this is one of the most informal and ad hoc. However, we think most observers who have spent time dealing with bureaucracies have an intuitive idea of what administrative costs are, and therefore it makes sense to ask whether some policy instruments impose more than others.
Performance. While it is clear that implemention of the command-and-control oriented Effluent Guidelines program -one of the key elements of the U.S. water case -imposed high administrative costs on the EPA, a number of the other cases carry more mixed messages. In the case of the U.S. lead phase down, the authors argue that the complexity and flexibility of the program increased the likelihood of both intentional and unintentiotnal violations, especially by smaller refiners and inexperienced fuel blenders. This, in turn, increased the monitoring and enforcement costs of the EPA. The authors argue that much of this problem is attributable to the fact that the program relied on a ratio of lead use to total output, rather than an overall cap on lead usage.
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The U.S. SO 2 cap and trade program has gained a reputation for low administrative costs, a feature that has made it popular with both EPA and industry. At the same time, the authors of the German SO 2 reduction program argue that there is no evidence that the administrative costs of designing and implementing their command-and-control type program were higher than for a comparable incentive-based program.
In the case of the U.S. NO x program, the authors argue that the command-and-control based phase I of OTC was probably more difficult to develop than the Phase II trading program, but only slightly so. They note that gratis pollution allocations present a regulator with rent-seeking behavior on behalf of market participants, thereby forcing the regulator to establish rules for allocation and, subsequently, for verifying claims for allocations. In addition, regulators are still faced with the burden of demonstrating that incentive-based polices are 'feasible'. In the case of the NOx SIP Call program this required the identification of available abatement controls, their applicability to U.S. facilities and coal-types, and electricity market modeling.
In Europe, the costs of administering the incentive-based (tax) measures used to regulate NOx emissions are thought to be quite low. In France, administration costs were allocated a fixed percentage rate of total tax revenues (6%). In Sweden, the SEPA estimates the central administrative costs to be approximately 0.6% of total yearly tax revenues. Monitoring requirements are an order of magnitude higher. In the French case, however, monitoring relies to a large extent on existing regulatory structures for control of standards-based regulation. A fair amount of flexibility was granted to the individual firms so they could choose whether to use direct measures or to apply emission coefficients set by the regulatory agency.
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The authors of the Dutch water study generally support the view that command-andcontrol approaches have higher administrative costs, although they note that the permitgranting and enforcement activities associated with the fee program have been substantial. In the same vein, the authors of the U.S. TCE case note that a GAO report identified the complexity and cost of establishing a facility specific baseline -a prerequisite to participating in the early reductions program --as an important barrier to the success of that program.
Overall, the evidence on this hypothesis is quite mixed. Although there is some evidence that administrative burdens associated with CAC rules are higher than for EIbased rules, there are also a number of counter examples. Clearly, further evidence is needed before firm conclusions can be reached on this issue.
Hot spots and spikes. The performance of all pollution abatement instruments is
seriously compromised for pollutants with highly differentiated spatial or temporal effects, but more so for EI than for CAC instruments.
Rationale. As noted, one of the regulators' chief concerns with EI instruments is the limited source-specific control that can be exercised over discharges at individual facilities. In a CAC system it is easier to require more stringent emission reductions at those plants where the emissions cause greater damage. If there were a few sources with high marginal damages, a CAC instrument that targets those sources directly would very likely be superior to an EI instrument (Rose-Ackerman 1973) . Likewise, during unusual weather conditions that make ordinary emission discharges hazardous, a short-term CAC instrument is likely to be more effective than an economic instrument.
There have been attempts to design EI instruments to address this problem, such as spatially or temporally varying emissions fees, so-called ambient permit markets (separate permit markets for each receptor, with each source required to hold a portfolio of permits for each receptor), or zoned permit markets (where sources are only allowed to trade within their zone). Some of these schemes have been analyzed by Montgomery (), Krupnick and Oates (19xx) , and Kneese and Bower (19xx) . Another possible remedy is a constant emission fee, with some of the revenues used to subsidize more extensive abatement at certain sources. With the exception of the Southern California RECLAIM program for controlling NO x emissions, however, these proposals have not been implemented, probably because of their unwieldiness.
Performance. It is certainly true that EI approaches offer the clearest advantages for controlling pollutants for which location does not matter, such as stratospheric ozone depleters, greenhouse gases, and lead. Though lead has high spatial differentiation, U.S. lead authors Newell and Rogers point out that environmental hot spots are not a significant concern since the pollution is created through gasoline consumption, not production, and there is likely little or no relationship between the location of refineries and automobile exhaust across the country.
In principle, a prescriptive approach to regulation could do a better job than incentivebased measures in targeting specific areas or time periods. In both TCE cases, for DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
example, the pollutant is a potential work-place hazard where micro/local aspects are dominant. On its face, this would tend to support prescriptive regulation in which regulators have the authority to prescribe more stringent controls where necessary to preserve environmental quality. Although an incentive-based approach could also be designed to protect specific areas or time periods, this often requires a relatively complex design.
In practice, however, the situation is not so clear: incentive-based measures may work to the detriment or to the benefit of any particular area. Evidence presented about the U.S. SO 2 program suggests that emissions trading has (serendipitously) benefited geographic areas which contain a disproportionate number of sensitive ecosystems and has led to aggregate health benefits in addition to those that would have resulted absent trading. However, this has not prevented state environmental authorities and public utility commissioners from trying to interfere with specific emission trades that would have the effect of increasing emissions in their state. Recently, moreover, some concerns about environmental justice have arisen with respect to the SO 2 trading program, although the evidence thus far presented suggests that the effect are at most fairly trivial.
Ironically, in the one EI case study where a hot-spot issue arose, the problem was that the emission fee was deeply discounted, not that it was insufficient to achieve environmental quality. Specifically, in the northern Netherlands, a financially distressed industry (potato starch) was for some time allowed to pay much lower emission fees than other industries, significantly delaying the achievement of acceptable water quality in the region. But this hardly counts as a mark against EI instruments, since similar exceptions are routinely granted in CA regimes.
Ultimately, if hot-spot problems do develop with EI regimes, there are potential remedies. The authors of the U.S. NO x case note that a hybrid approach may be a useful way of addressing them. They observe that while the OTC trading program confers considerable flexibility in achieving abatement requirements beyond RACT, the RACT standards are still in place during the trading season. In effect there is a limit to the concentration of pollution that can be released from any source, so the potential for emissions hot-spots is reduced. In addition, correction of hot spots is a potential use of the revenues collected from fees and permit auctions, as those revenues could be used to subsidize the construction of abatement equipment in particular locations.
Monitoring requirements.
The monitoring requirements of EI policies are more demanding than those of CAC policies because they require credible and quantitative emission estimates, whereas CAC policies at most require evidence of excess emissions.
Rationale. Certainly, it is easier to detect compliance for a CAC standard that only requires use of a designated technology than for any EI instrument. As for performance standards, many of the monitoring methods that have been used to determine compliance in CAC regimes cannot be used for EI policies, because they don't measure mass emissions that are typically required for determining compliance with EI instruments. Examples include opacity tests, property line measurements, and inferences drawn from DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. equipment malfunctions. However, with the long-term decline of the cost of monitoring in the last two decades, many if not most major sources of pollution now are required to have continuous monitoring or frequent emission sampling, so that the significance of this issue has lessened over time.
Performance. Although only a limited number of cases report information on monitoring requirements, the results do not generally support the notion that incentive-based approaches are more demanding then command-and-control policies. In the case of SO 2 , it appears that both the German and the U.S. programs adopted continuous emissions monitors (CEMs), although the U.S. authors claim that other techniques, e.g., coal sampling and engineering formulas could have been used to estimate SO 2 emissions at less cost and nearly as accurately. Expensive monitors (CEMS), they argue, were necessary to achieve a political consensus. Similarly, in the U.S. NOx case Title IV required CEMs (at least for major sources), so the monitoring requirements were the same under all the programs after 1990. Previously, NSPS did not require CEMs.
A particularly interesting story emerges in the case of European NOx controls. Here, the authors argue, the high fees made emissions more visible both to management and to the regulators. The perceived importance of accuracy in emission measurement increased, as significant monetary payments were based on these emission numbers. In fact, one of the principal 'discoveries' of the Swedish program was that emissions were very sensitive to small changes in plant operations. Detailed monitoring is the only way plant engineers themselves could determine the effects of small changes in temperature and other combustion conditions on the overall operation and, particularly, the cost-effectiveness of the facility.
The U.S. lead case generally supports the notion that the difficulties of monitoring are not significantly different under the alternative regulatory approaches. Specifically, the EPA delegated the responsibilities of data collection and assimilation to the refiners themselves, which then reported their figures to the agency. Figures on lead usage were easily checked against sales figures of additive suppliers. Gasoline volume was not as easily monitored as lead, however, and more enforcement cases involved misreported output than misreported lead use. In the view of the authors, while it may be true that the marketable permit program required monitoring a greater quantity and variety of information than a command-and-control policy would have, the collection of this information was fairly straightforward and inexpensive.
Overall, based on our limited sample, there is not strong and consistent evidence that incentive-based policies pose more onerous monitoring requirements than prescriptive ones. New programs of both types -operating on both sides of the Atlanticincreasingly require similar, high tech methods for measuring emissions, assuring compliance and the like. As noted, in at least one case (Swedish NO x ), the stringent monitoring requirements helped firms to achieve certain operational efficiencies by fine tuning the temperature and other combustion conditions in their boilers.
Tax interaction effects.
Adverse tax interaction effects are likely to be larger with EI instruments than CAC instruments achieving the same emission reductions.
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Rationale. The theoretical literature suggests that interaction of environmental regulations with pre-existing regulations or taxes causes the social cost of new regulations to be higher than would be measured in partial equilibrium analysis. One important type of hidden cost stems from the interaction of the program with the preexisting tax system, such as the labor income tax, which imposes a difference between the before-tax wage (or the value of the marginal product of labor to firms) and the aftertax wage (or the opportunity cost of labor from the worker's perspective).
Any regulation that raises product prices potentially imposes a hidden cost on the economy by lowering the real wage of workers. This can be viewed as a "virtual tax" magnifying the significance of previous taxes, with losses in productivity as a consequence.
Economic instruments allow for more efficient allocation of emissions reductions among regulated firms than prescriptive approaches. However, particularly if these efficiency savings are not great, economic instruments are likely to impose a greater cost through the tax interaction effect. The reason is that they drive up a firm's marginal production costs not only by the abatement costs but also by the cost of the emissions embodied in another unit of output. The corresponding price increase serves to erode further the real wage. This tax-interaction effect can be at least partially offset if abatement costs under the EI mechanism are lower than under the CAC, or if the environmental policy raises revenue that can be used to reduce reliance on distortionary taxes, or at least to mitigate the price impact of the regulation.
Performance. Though this hypothesis is not empirically testable directly, researchers have examined these tax interactions in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and found the importance of pre-existing tax distortions to depend strongly on the details of particular policies. Because an environmental policy has to have major effects in the broader economy before the tax interaction effects become noticeable, it is of special interest in the debate over global climate change policy.
Among the EI cases we examine, none used the revenues to reduce other tax rates. In both of the relevant cap and trade cases (U.S. SO 2 and NO x ), permits were grandfathered. In the US SO 2 case, the difference in the tax distortion may have made the policy almost as costly as the CAC program (cite?). In the Dutch water case, the fee revenues were returned to industry to support new investments. In the Swedish NO x case, revenues were rebated back to firms based on generation output. Theoretical analyses have shown that this tax-rebate mechanism is approximately equivalent to a tradable performance standard (Fischer 2001) ; both encourage abatement but relieve firms of the additional cost, on average, of the emissions embodied in output. Consequently, one would expect a lesser tax interaction with this mechanism. On the other hand, the weaker price increase also sends less of a signal to encourage conservation as a means of reducing emissions, so these allocation mechanisms are still less efficient than optimal revenue recycling. However, in all these cases the authors argue that it would not have been politically acceptable to use the revenues to offset other (distortionary) taxes. DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. Goulder et al. (1997) investigated the magnitude of the tax-interaction effect in the context of the SO 2 program and find that it adds an additional 70 percent to their estimated compliance costs for the program, under the assumption that electricity prices are set in the market rather than by regulators, which is increasingly the case. However, if prices are set by regulators based on the cost of service, then the regulatory burden is much lower because allowances under Title IV were distributed at zero original cost. If the government were to auction the SO2 allowances and use the revenue from the auction to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, the additional cost falls to 29 percent of estimated compliance costs.
Effects on altruism.
Economic incentives encourage the notion that the environment is "just another commodity" and reduces willingness of firms and citizens to provide environmental public goods voluntarily. CAC policies are consistent with a norm that requires every discharger to "do his best" and thus provide a better basis for a change in social and personal attitudes about one's responsibility to the environment. (Kelman 1981) Rationale. In a regulatory context altruism is easy enough to define: voluntary limitation of emission discharges to rates lower than the unconstrained level or than what the regulation allows. It can also be readily observed, for one can usually observe both the emission standard and the actual emission rate. While there may be several other reasons why plants "overcontrol" emissions (such as indivisibilities in abatement equipment or concern about excess emissions during process upsets), but whether this is truly "altruism" is less important than the fact that emissions are less than expected.
In an EI context, the definition of altruism is also straightforward: lower emissions than what is economically justified based on the emission fee or the permit price. Furthermore, when this is observed it almost certainly represents voluntary emission reductions, because in an EI regime the other justifications for emission reductions are not present. However, it is more difficult to observe, because determining whether the emissions are "economically justified" requires the observer to know the marginal abatement costs. But the usual way marginal abatement costs are estimated is to equate them to the observed price! In other words, in an EI regime the only way to conclude that the firm is behaving altruistically is to assert that marginal abatement costs are higher than the emission fee or permit price, but it is not clear what the basis of such an assertion would be.
Perhaps this is another reason for skepticism about the presence of altruism in EI regimes. Presumably a firm engages in altruistic behavior in order to gain other, nonmonetary benefits, such as a reputation for public-spiritedness. If the good behavior cannot be conclusively observed, how can the firm earn this reputation? It would be better off choosing another venue for altruism.
Performance. As expected, there were few signs of voluntary behavior among the economic incentive cases. In the Dutch water quality case study, authors Bressers and Lulofs noted that among the employees at many firms there was a genuine desire to reduce pollution, and the fees may have reduced the conflicts within the business between DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
doing the right thing for the shareholders and for the environment. However, a CAC policy would very likely have had the same effect.
For the CAC instruments, there is mixed evidence that the companies were operating in an altruistic manner. In the U.S. water pollution case, industries fought fiercely against the establishment of the Effluent Guidelines. The EPA had to litigate virtually every rule and every important issue raised. During the 1970s and early 1980s there was little evidence that firms or trade associations were willing to "meet the Agency halfway" in responding to the Guidelines. Something similar appears to have happened in the TCE cases, where the stringent regulation provoked an almost "anti-green" reaction among some companies. On the other hand, there was evidence from several case studies that pollution abatement typically exceeded the regulatory requirements. In the German SO 2 study, the average emission rate (in mg/l) achieved by 1995 was only 38.5% of the emission standard. Even for the Effluent Guidelines some well-known national firms made it a practice to exceed performance requirements with a substantial margin, so that there would never be questions raised about compliance. Also significant is the case of the Swedish firm SKF, which after the TCE ban in its home country, decided to phase out TCE all over the world and not just in their Swedish plants.
11. Adaptability. Compared to CAC instruments, EI instruments can be changed more quickly and easily in response to changing environmental or economic conditions.
Rationale. Changing any policy that regulated sources and others have adapted to is likely to provoke considerable resistance, whether it is to make the policy more or less stringent, but it is likely to be particularly difficult for CAC systems. Behind this hypothesis is the observation that EI instruments are defined by a small number of parameters. To change the stringency of an emission fee system, just raise or lower the emission fee or the number of tradable permits. With permits, one would have to be careful not to confiscate permits held by firms or destroy their value by issuing new permits.
Since CAC systems tend to be tailored to individual sources or categories of sources, changing the regulation could require changing many regulations instead of just one tax rate, say. This is more difficult administratively, and probably also politically, as the multiplicity of separate regulatory actions gives the opposition plenty of opportunities to fight the change.
Performance. a review of the actual cases indicates that incentive-based and prescriptive approaches can be quite similar in their inability to adapt to new information. For example, a well-known flaw of Title IV of the Clean Air Act was that as new information became available about the relative benefits and costs of SO 2 reductions, there was no ability to change the cap short of an act of Congress. 10 A more prescriptive approach, such as the NO x provisions of Title IV, shares this attribute.
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The French NO x tax was notably slow to change, as its levels were fixed (too low) for 5 years. However, the authors argue, an advantage of the French tax was that it allowed for government and regulatory agencies to collect and improve information on emission levels and abatement actions undertaken by firms in different industry sectors. In this sense, it yielded a distinct advantage compared to the existing CAC regulation. In the Dutch water case it was noted that the provincial authorities -which must approve fee increases by the water boards --tend to be more reluctant to grant increases during recessions than during periods of a booming economy.
An alternative to a firm cap would be one that adjusted in response to new information. Others have suggested similar trigger mechanisms on emission caps to provide economic relief if costs are greater than expected (Pizer, 2002) but, as the SO 2 case study authors argue, such an approach might be more politically acceptable if coupled with a mechanism that provided additional environmental improvement when costs are less than expected. A safety valve that relaxes the cap when allowance prices hit a specified level, or lowers the cap when allowance prices are below a floor, acts like a tax system in this regard by incorporating new information about costs.
Perhaps the most interesting situation involving adaptability can be found in the Effluent Guidelines program, which appears to be changing in ways that no one anticipated when it began back in 1972. At that time the focus of the program was on the technologybased standards for direct dischargers. In recent years, direct dischargers, while still important in some industries, have gradually become fewer in number and less important in environmental terms. Furthermore, among indirect dischargers it is likely that waste surcharges are having increasingly larger incentive effects as rates are being raised by local POTWs for revenue purposes. Thus, as author Harrington notes, this quintessential regulatory program may be gradually evolving into a hybrid program with important EI elements.
12. Cost revelation. With EI instruments, it is easier to observe the cost of environmental regulation.
Rationale. Theory tells us that for a firm subject to an emission fee, the marginal cost is the same as the fee rate; in a tradable permit regime, the marginal cost is the market price of the permits. Under a CAC instrument, a firm must clean up to a prespecified quantity; there are no fees or permit prices to which marginal costs can be equated.
Performance. To begin, we are reminded by the authors of the Dutch case study that the equating of marginal costs of abatement to the effluent tax rate or to the price of permits is a theoretical result, not an empirical observation. Based on their research Bressers and Lulofs argue that firms do not generally know what portion of their costs are driven by abatement concerns. However, they also point out that at least the firms have to make a calculation of how much to abate, just as they have to calculate how much of other inputs they use. The choice of abatement level has to be based on something, and it is almost certainly closer to the point equating price and marginal cost than would obtain in a CAC regime.
Clearly, the economic incentive instruments in our sample elicited considerable information about the cost of abatement, but there were also complicating factors in several cases. Probably the most successful case in this respect was the U.S. Acid Rain program. The cap and trade program provided a way to observe marginal costs and to infer total costs. However, originally this information was not widely disseminated, because allowance prices do not need to be reported to the EPA. Independent allowance trading firms have developed indices to make such information more readily available. Also the EPA allowance auction can reveal important information about prices, and the first EPA auction in 1993 was particularly important in this regard. Such information is not available with a prescriptive regulation. At the same time, even actual price information can be misleading and require careful interpretation. During the first few years of the program, the price of allowance price fell to $100 per ton or less, which according to most observers is far below the long-run marginal cost of abatement. Apparently, a number of utilities made major investments in flue gas desulfurization, creating a glut that caused prices to crash. Since the mid-1990s they have recovered to $150-175 per ton.
In hybrid CAC/EI systems the information revealed by the economic instrument depends on whether that instrument is binding. At $40 per tonne, the French NOx tax is probably too low to have incentive effects (which are provided by the emission standard in force), but the Swedish NOx tax is something else entirely. Its rate of $4000 per tonne is almost certainly the binding constraint, so the level of the tax clearly reveals something about marginal abatement costs.
In the U.S. leaded gasoline case, Hahn and Hester estimate from anecdotal evidence that the price of lead removal to be under $.01 per gram prior to banking, and from $.02 to $.05 during the banking phase when standards were becoming increasingly stringent (Hahn and Hester 1989) . However, this was a system based on lead concentrations, not on total lead in fuel, which meant that some assumptions were required to get to total lead. Were the program designed more in the spirit of the SO 2 trading program, with clearly specified lead allowances rather than the lead averaging scheme, an even clearer market price would likely have emerged as it has in the SO 2 market.
The one instance where EI instruments do not reveal the costs, even in principle, occurs when there is a so-called corner solution in an effluent fee regime. Consider, for example, the use by several European countries of a tax differential policy to ensure that the price of leaded fuel remained above the price of unleaded. That is, the countries involved were seeking a corner solution, at least after about 1995 when valve seat recession in older engines ceased to be an issue. As case study authors Hammar and Löfgren report, the tax differential -together with the fact that it was successful -does reveal an upper bound of the cost of removing lead from gasoline. Not surprisingly, that differential was much larger than the imputed cost of lead removal in the U.S., where the tradable permit program did elicit cost information from the refinery industry. However, the U.S. lead permit trading program did not reveal the cost of eliminating lead from gasoline, because the program having switched back to a CAC program by the time of the final phaseout.
Conclusion
Simple and dramatic conclusions, the staple of newspaper headlines, rarely emerge from collections of detailed studies such as those we discuss here. Yet at the risk of oversimplifying, we start with the most basic observation of all: based on a dozen cases drawn from Europe and the U.S., it appears that environmental regulation, as well as the art of regulatory analysis, are alive in well. While this comes as no shock to policy experts, it remains surprisingly common to hear complaints, emanating largely from the business community, that environmental regulations are not very effective in achieving results. Further, they argue, environmental agencies routinely underestimate the costs involved.
These case studies document significant environmental results. Averaged across all the cases, emissions fell by about two-thirds when compared to baseline estimates. While any comparison with an estimated baseline is, by its very nature, hypothetical, the fact that the authors were able to document the credibility of the baseline assumptions as well as the actual emission reductions, supports the basic observation that regulations can be quite effective in achieving environmental results.
Also interesting is the fact that the case study authors were able to find or re-create ex ante estimates of expected emission reductions in all of the U.S. cases and in four of the European cases. Comparison of the ex ante with ex post observations suggests a reasonable degree of accuracy in the estimates. Not surprisingly, the cases where emission reductions were greater than expected involved EI instruments. The cases where reductions fell short of expectations involved CAC approaches. This finding, consistent with other literature, suggests that regulators may be unduly pessimistic about the performance of EI instruments or unduly optimistic about the performance of CAC approaches.
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A further set of observations concerns the actual categorization of rules. As noted earlier, in all cases examined in this project except the German SO 2 ordinance, the policies consisted of a mix of CAC and EI instruments. How did this come about? As far as we are aware, none of these policies were hybrids to begin with, and there were no cases where we observed what was initially an EI policy that took on CAC elements. Rather, they began as CAC instruments and over time had EI components added. For some -the ones we consider "EI" -the pre-existing CAC policy was superseded, but not abandoned, and remains to set a minimum level of performance. This minimum level is the binding constraint for few if any sources, however. Perhaps these CAC relics persist because of a reluctance among regulators to trust the market completely, or maybe their repeal would have the appearance of a retreat, so they are retained for cosmetic reasons. The policies we characterize as CAC also began life as CAC policies, with EI elements added later. It DRAFT Please do not quote or cite.
is reasonable to suppose that they are on a transition path themselves but aren't far enough along yet to be characterized as "incentive" policies (and it is certainly not inevitable that any will complete the journey).
The continued growth in popularity of EI instruments is due in part to the actual and perceived success of existing examples, of which the ones considered in this book are among the most prominent. This growing interest is consistent with the results of our case studies, which, we would say, generally support the continued use of market-based instruments. This can be seen in Table 2 , which summarizes our discussion above of the hypotheses. In the table we have sorted the hypotheses so that the ones favoring EI appear first, followed by the ones favoring CAC. In each group, there are six hypotheses, and in each three are supported and three are not. This arrangement makes it appear as though our "competition" between EI and CAC instruments ended in a dead heat.
However, we would argue that these hypotheses are not all of equal importance. In our view, the most important are efficiency, both static and dynamic, effectiveness, and regulatory burden. Of the remaining hypotheses (e.g. monitoring requirements, hot spots, administrative burden), many are special cases of these two and are of secondary importance. In addition, questions of effectiveness and efficiency were at the core of the controversy over the initial selection of policy instruments in the 1970s and 1980s. As advertised by their proponents, economic incentive instruments do appear to produce cost savings in pollution abatement, as well as a steady stream of innovations that reduce cost of abatement. On the other hand, the main concern of opponents of EI instruments -that they would not work -is not borne out in these case studies. In the cases presented in this book they worked quite well.
However, the finding of economic efficiency of EI instruments is tempered by one other strong finding from these comparisons. As discussed in the preceding section, the regulatory burden hypothesis -the idea that polluters prefer CAC to EI because of the tax payment or purchase of permits required by EI policies in addition to abatement expenditures -received strong support. Indeed, for all but one of the EI instruments examined, the actual or potential revenue raised by EI instruments has been reimbursed to users, either by explicit tax distributions (as in the Swedish NOx tax) or by grandfathering emission permits. The only exception was the Dutch effluent fees, which were used to finance wastewater treatment facilities. (In fact that was their design use; their incentive properties didn't emerge until later.)
Using revenues in this way, of course, means they cannot be used for other purposes, thus short-circuiting one of the chief advantages of economic incentives, namely that they generate a source of revenue to (potentially) overcome the problems raised by regulation. For example, they could be used to correct a pre-existing tax distortion exacerbated by the instrument; or to overcome a hot spot problem by subsidizing additional abatement; or to correct a perceived or actual inequity in their application. In almost all real-world cases, those opportunities have been foreclosed by the need to gain political support by easing the regulatory burden imposed on polluting firms. This apparent inability, in practice, to use the revenues generated by EI instruments to address hot spots or other regulatory problems may be particularly important vis-a-vis adverse tax interactions. In DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. 
Yes
If the emission standard is stringent enough, as in the German SO 2 ordinance, then there is no EI advantage. 2. Information requirements. Generally, EI instruments require less information than CAC instruments to achieve emission reductions costeffectively.
No
All policies turned out to require much information.
Yes
This often shows up not in patentable innovations, but in site-specific changes to equipment and operating practices. No 5. Regulatory burden. Regulated sources will tend to prefer CAC instruments to EI instruments, because of the strong possibility that they have to pay more under EI even though the social costs may be less.
The only major EI instruments that have been adopted have overcome this problem by designing instruments to be revenueneutral (i.e. grandfathered tradable permit systems or recycling of effluent tax revenues) 7. Hot spots and spikes. The performance of all pollution-abatement instruments is seriously compromised for pollutants with highly differentiated spatial or temporal effects, but more so for EI than for CAC instruments. Yes 8. Monitoring requirements. The monitoring requirements of EI policies are more demanding than those of CAC policies because they require credible and quantitative emission estimates.
No
Monitoring requirements of both instrumentshave been exacting.
Yes
Effects on altruism.
Economic incentives encourage the notion that the environment is "just another commodity" and reduce the willingness of firms and citizens to provide environmental public goods voluntarily. In 1992 the Swedish government imposed a revenue-neutral fee on emissions of NO x from utility and industrial boilers. Taxes are paid into a fund according to the quantity of emission from each plant, and are refunded to sources according to their electricity outputs. In France a NO x emission tax was imposed with no attempt at revenue neutrality and at a much lower rate than the Swedish rate. In 1970, the Netherlands implemented an effluent charge for industrial wastewater for organic pollutants. By 1990 effluent discharges had dropped by almost 75 percent even though industrial production increased over the period.
Industrial water pollution: effluent fees (Netherlands) vs. Effluent Guidelines and
U.S. Effluent Guidelines. "Regulating Industrial Water Pollution in the United
States' by Winston Harrington, RFF.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 required every industrial facility discharging wastewater into the nation's waterways to have a permit specifying the amounts of various pollutants that plants are allowed to discharge. To assist permitwriters in the states and EPA regional offices in the preparation of these permits, the EPA was directed to prepare a very detailed set of technology-based pollutant discharge standards in about 60 major polluting industries.
Leaded gasoline: Marketable permits for leaded fuel production (U.S.) vs. mandatory lead phase-outs plus differential taxes to prevent misfueling (most European countries)
U.S. leaded gasoline phaseout. "The U.S. Experience with the Phasedown of Lead in Gasoline," by Richard Newell and Kristian Rogers, RFF.
Beginning in 1974 and coincidental with the introduction of catalyst-equipped vehicles, manufacturers were required to offer unleaded gasoline for sale. The U.S. has had a complex policy that began as a CAC policy, was switched to economic incentives in 1981, and switched back to CAC in 1988. In 1995, leaded gasoline was banned for all vehicles.
Phaseout of leaded gasoline in Europe. "Phase Out of Leaded Gasoline: The European Experience," by Henrik Hammar and Åsa Lofgren, University of Gothenburg.
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Most European countries relied on a policy specifying a date after which sale of leaded fuel would be illegal, coupled with a differential tax to ensure the price of leaded fuel exceeded that of unleaded, in order to prevent misfueling.
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) permit market (U.S.) vs. mandatory phase-outs (other industrial countries)
United States. The U.S. used a tradable permit policy to phase out production of CFCs.
Europe. EU allocated emission caps to each European nation, and gave each the responsibility to used specific regulations to phase out the production and use of CFCs. To be expanded…see expanded analysis by Hammitt.
Both cases described in "Regulation of Stratospheric-Ozone-Depleting Substances," by James K. Hammit, School of Public Health, Harvard University.
Chlorinated solvents: source regulation (U.S.) vs. three distinct policy approaches (from the U.S. and from each other) in Europe.
Chlorinated solvent regulation in Germany, Sweden and Norway. These three countries regulate chlorinated solvents very differently. Sweden has imposed a ban on a narrow set of compounds, notably tricholroethylene (TCE); Germany has created a system of detailed technology-based regulations; and Norway has imposed a tax on a variety of chlorinated solvents.
Chlorinated solvent regulation in the U.S. Solvents are regulated under several statutes with a strong but not exclusive reliance on CAC instruments. EPA drinking-water regulations place maximum contaminant limits (MCLs) on certain solvents, including TCE in finished water. OSHA regulates occupational exposure to TCE. TCE is an important chemical compound at RCRA and CERCLA sites. It is also in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI).
In Table 1 we list the various components of these 12 policies, separated by whether those components might reasonably be characterized as "EI" or "CAC." As this table shows, every policy under review here except one actually contained a mix of EI and CAC instruments.
Within a case these instrument mixes appear in different ways. Some are barely mixed, predominantly CAC but containing traces of EI (such as US TCE); others are vice versa (such as Swedish NOx). In the U.S. leaded fuel case we find CAC and EI instruments applied sequentially. In European TCE, different instruments are used contemporaneously in different countries. In U.S. industrial water pollution, a few experiments with marketable permits have taken place within an overall CAC framework, and the waste surcharges imposed on POTWs may be taking on the incentive properties of effluent fees. In the U.S. acid rain case, an EI policy was imposed on top of an existing CAC structure, much of which remained in place. Note that there are few cases where the same source is subject to both types of instruments at the same time. And even in those cases where a source is subject to two constraints on behavior, at any particular DRAFT Please do not quote or cite. point in time only one will be active. In principle at least, it is possible to observe the various instruments at work. In practice, the mix of instruments may make it more difficult to determine the effects of each, but it does not necessarily ruin our prospects of examining the performance of different types of regulatory instruments.
